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ABSTRACT
Electricity is a paradoxical economic good: it is highly homogeneous and hetero-
geneous at the same time. Electricity prices vary dramatically between moments
in time, between location, and according to lead-time between contract and de-
livery. This three-dimensional heterogeneity has implication for the economic
assessment of power generation technologies: different technologies, such as coal-
fired plants and wind turbines, produce electricity that has, on average, a different
economic value. Several tools that are used to evaluate generators in practice
ignore these value differences, including “levelized electricity costs”, “grid par-
ity”, and simple macroeconomic models. This paper provides a rigorous and
general discussion of heterogeneity and its implications for the economic assess-
ment of electricity generating technologies. It shows that these tools are biased,
specifically, they tend to favor wind and solar power over dispatchable generators
where these renewable generators have a high market share. A literature review
shows that, at a wind market share of 30–40%, the value of a megawatt-hour of
electricity from a wind turbine can be 20–50% lower than the value of one me-
gawatt-hour as demanded by consumers. We introduce “System LCOE” as one
way of comparing generation technologies economically.
Keywords: Power generation, Electricity sector, Integrated assessment
modeling, Wind power, Solar power, Variable renewables, Integration costs,
Welfare economics, Power economics, Levelized electricity cost, LCOE, Grid
parity
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1. INTRODUCTION
In several parts of the world, it is cheaper to generate electricity from wind than from
conventional power sources such as coal-fired plants, and many observers expect wind turbine costs
to continue to fall. It is widely believed that this cost advantage by itself implies that wind power
is profitable (as a private investment option) or efficient (for society). However, this is not the case.
Inferring about competitiveness from a cost advantage would only be correct if electricity
was a homogenous economic good. If that was the case, one megawatt-hour of electricity generated
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1. We have approached this topic from different angles: the market value of wind and solar power (Hirth 2013, 2015b),
integration costs (Hirth et al. 2015, Ueckerdt et al. 2013a, 2013b), and optimal deployment of renewables (Hirth 2015a).
by wind turbines would be a perfect substitute for one MWh of electricity generated by coal plants,
and their output could be compared on a pure cost basis. However, electricity prices vary over time,
which makes electricity a heterogeneous good.
We show how ignoring heterogeneity introduces two biases. First, it favors conventional
base-load generators relative to peak-load generators, and second, at high penetration rates, it favors
variable renewable energy sources (VRE), such as wind and solar power, relative to dispatchable
generators. Tools that are used in practice for policy advice and decision support implicitly assume
homogeneity and thus run the risk of biasing results: “levelized costs of electricity” (LCOE), “grid
parity”, and large numerical economical models.
LCOE are the discounted lifetime average generation costs per unit of energy ($/MWh).
Electricity generation technologies, such as coal-fired power plants and wind turbines, are often
compared in terms of LCOE (for references see section 4d). Many readers interpret a cost advantage
as a signal of competitiveness. Such reasoning implicitly assumes that the electricity generated by
all plant types has the same economic value. This is not, however, the case. The same caveat applies
to “grid parity”, the point where generation costs drop below the retail electricity price. Many
macroeconomic models implicitly assume homogeneity as well. Calibrated macroeconomic multi-
sector models such as integrated assessment models (IAM) and computable general equilibrium
(CGE) models are heavily used for research and policy advice. Simple versions of such models
implicitly assume the output of different power technologies to be perfect substitutes, which makes
model results prone to the above-mentioned biases.
Building on earlier work,1 this paper applies standard microeconomic methods to the power
sector, and shows how these methods have to be adopted to accommodate the peculiar characteristics
of electricity as an economic good. It offers a rigorous and general discussion of heterogeneity,
arguing that electricity prices vary not only over time, but also across space, and with respect to
lead-time between contract and delivery. As a consequence, the economic value of electricity gen-
erated by different power plant technologies is not identical. In other words, different power plant
types produce different goods. LCOE and grid parity do not account for heterogeneity and hence
do not account for value differences, which is why they can be biased. The paper shows that value
differences can be interpreted as system-level costs. A new cost metric is proposed as the sum of
LCOE and system-level costs of a technology, System LCOE, which allows for economically
meaningful cost comparisons. Finally, the paper applies this theoretical framework to wind and
solar power. We argue that the difference between “variable” and “dispatchable” generators is
quantitative, rather than qualitative.
This article relates to several branches of the literature: screening curves (Phillips et al.
1969, Stoughton et al. 1980, Green 2005), numerical power market models to optimize the gen-
eration mix (Covarrubias 1979, Neuhoff et al. 2008, Lamont 2008, Mu¨sgens 2013), marginal value
of wind and solar power (Grubb 1991, Borenstein 2008, Mills & Wiser 2012, Schmalensee 2013),
integration costs (Sims et al. 2011, Holttinen et al. 2011, Milligan et al. 2011, NEA 2012, Sijm
2014), and integrated assessment modelling (Luderer et al. 2014, Sullivan et al. 2013).
The paper contributes to these branches of the literature by providing theoretical founda-
tions. It adapts textbook microeconomics to accommodate the peculiarities of electricity generation
and discusses the implications in a welfare-economic framework.
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Figure 1: Observed Electricity Prices in Germany and Texas
Electricity prices vary between moments in time (left, hourly German day-ahead spot prices), between locations (mid, Texas
nodal prices), and between different lead times between contract and delivery (right, spread between day-ahead and real-
time prices in Germany).
2. In some markets, certificates of origin exist, in order to allow consumers to discriminate between different power
sources (Kalkuhl et al. 2012). However, such certificates are traded independently from electricity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses heterogeneity and
gives a formal definition. Section 3 derives first-order conditions for the optimal power mix. Section
4 suggests an alternative formulation of first-order conditions and shows how neglecting hetero-
geneity can bias findings. Section 5 proposes a decomposition of system costs. Section 6 discusses
the economics of VRE. Section 7 concludes.
2. ELECTRICITY IS A HETEROGENEOUS GOOD
Electricity is a paradoxical economic good, being at the same time homogeneous and
heterogeneous. In the one hand, it is a homogenous (undifferentiated) commodity, possibly more
so than most other commodities. On the other hand, it is also heterogeneous (differentiated) in the
sense that its price can vary dramatically between different moments in time (Boiteux 1949, Bes-
sembinder & Lemmon 2002, and Joskow 2011). This section argues that electricity is not only
heterogeneous over time, but along two further dimensions: space, and lead-time between contract
and delivery. Figure 1 illustrates how wholesale electricity prices vary along these three dimensions,
using observed price data from Germany and Texas.
2.1 Homogeneity of Electricity
Electricity can be seen as the archetype of a perfectly homogenous commodity: consumers
cannot distinguish electricity produced by different power sources, such as wind turbines or coal-
fired plants.2 In other words, electricity from one source is a perfect substitute for electricity from
another source, both in production functions and utility functions. The law of one price applies:
electricity from wind has the same economic value as electricity from coal.
This perfect substitutability is reflected in the real-world market structure, where bilateral
contracts are not fulfilled physically in the sense that electrons are delivered from one party to
another, but via an “electricity pool”: generators inject energy to the grid and the consumer feed
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3. This definition excludes small price variations, such as changes driven by intra-year discounting.
4. Inventories both prevent predictable price fluctuations and limit random price fluctuations.
out the same quantity. In liberalized markets, electricity is traded under standardized contracts on
power exchanges. Wholesale markets for electricity, both spot and future markets, share many
similarities with markets for other homogenous commodities such as crude oil, hard coal, natural
gas, metals, or agricultural bulk products.
However, homogeneity applies only at a certain point in time. Since storing electricity is
(very) costly, the price of electricity varies over time. More precisely, its price is subject to large
predictable and random fluctuations on time scales as short as days, hours, and minutes. Before we
discuss this and the other two dimensions of heterogeneity, we formally define “homogeneity” and
“heterogeneity”.
2.2 A Formal Definition of Heterogeneity
We classify a good as heterogeneous if its marginal economic value is variable. More
formally, we define a good q to be heterogeneous along a certain dimension (e.g., time) if its
marginal economic values varies significantly between different points p (e.g., hours) within a
certain range P (e.g., one year).
We define the “instantaneous” marginal economic value at a point as the derivativev p∈Pp
of welfare W with respect to an increase of consumption of q at point p.
∂W(q , ⋅ )p
v := ∀p∈P (1)p ∂qp
We define a good to be homogeneous along a dimension if
v v ∀p,q∈P (2)p q
Otherwise, the good is heterogeneous along that dimension.3
For example, a good is heterogeneous in time if its marginal value differs significantly
between two moments during one year; a good is heterogeneous in space if its marginal value
differs significantly between two locations in one country. Examples of heterogeneous goods include
hotel rooms (which are more expensive during the holiday season or during trade fairs than oth-
erwise), airplane travel (which is more expensive on Fridays and Mondays than the rest of the
week), and many personal services.
Heterogeneity requires three conditions. The most fundamental condition for heterogeneity
is the absence of arbitrage possibilities. For example, storable goods feature little price fluctuations
over time, because inventories allow for inter-temporal arbitrage,4 and, in the same way, transport-
able goods feature little price fluctuation across space.
Constrained arbitrage is a necessary condition of heterogeneity, but it is not sufficient.
Demand and/or supply conditions also need to differ between points along the dimension. Take the
example of time: if supply and demand functions are unchanged over time, the absence of electricity
storage would not lead to price fluctuations. In addition, both demand and supply need to be less
than perfectly price-elastic. For example, if the supply curve was horizontal, despite demand fluc-
tuations and lack of storability, the price would remain unchanged.
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Summing up, there are three conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient
to make a heterogeneous good: 1. constrained arbitrage; 2. differences in demand and/or supply
conditions; 3. non-horizontal demand and supply curves.
2.3 The Three Dimensional Heterogeneity of Electricity
We now come back to the three dimensions of the heterogeneity of electricity. The physics
of electricity imposes three arbitrage constraints, along the dimensions time, space, and lead-time:
• Electricity is electromagnetic energy. It can be stored directly in inductors and capacitors, or
indirectly in the form of chemical energy (battery, hydrogen), kinetic energy (flywheel), or
potential energy (pumped hydro storage). In all these cases, energetic losses and capital costs
make storage very, often prohibitively, expensive. Hence, arbitrage over time is limited. The
storage constraint makes electricity heterogeneous over time: it is economically different to
produce (or consume) electricity “now or then”.
• Electricity cannot be transported on ships or trucks, in the same way as tangible goods. It is
transmitted on power lines which have limited thermal capacity, and give rise to losses.
Moreover, Kirchhoff’s circuit laws, which govern load flows in meshed networks, further
constrain transmission capacity, and transmission distances are limited by reactance. The
transmission constraint makes arbitrage limited between locations and electricity becomes
heterogeneous across space: it is economically different to produce electricity “here or there”.
• In alternating power (AC) systems, demand and supply have to be balanced at every moment
in time. Imbalances cause frequency deviations, which can destroy machinery and become
very costly. However, thermal power generators are limited in their ability to quickly adjust
output as there are limits on temperature gradients in boilers and turbines (ramping and cycling
constraints). Hence, arbitrage is limited across different lead-times between contract and de-
livery. The flexibility constraint makes electricity heterogeneous along lead-time: it is eco-
nomically different to produce electricity with a flexible or an inflexible plant, and forecast
errors can be costly.
Summing up, storage “links stuff in time”, transmission “links stuff in space”, and flexibility “links
stuff in lead-time”. Since storage, transmission, and flexibility are constrained, electricity is a het-
erogeneous good in time, space, and lead-time (Table 1).
“Lead-time” might be less intuitive than the other dimensions and merits some further
discussion. Think of three types of generators: inflexible generators that produce according to a
schedule that is specified one day in advance, like nuclear power; flexible generators that can quickly
adjust, like gas-fired plants; and stochastic generators that are subject to day-ahead forecast errors,
like wind power. If demand is higher than expected, only flexible generators are able to fill the gap.
In such conditions the real-time price rises above the day-ahead price, and hence, everything else
equal, flexible generators receive a higher average price than inflexible generators. Contrast this
with the stochastic generators: when they generate more than expected, there tends to be oversupply
in the real-time market, and hence they sell disproportionally at a lower price.
Figure 2 visualizes three-dimensional heterogeneity. Each axis represents one dimension.
The length of each axis represents the “range” P: one year, one power system, and the complete
set of spot markets. At a given point in this three-dimensional space, electricity is a perfectly
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Table 1: The Heterogeneity of Electricity Along Three Dimensions
Dimension
(differences between points
in . . .)
Time Space
Lead-time
between contract and
delivery
Arbitrage constraint Storage
(storing electricity is
costly*)
Transmission
(transmitting electricity is
costly*)
Flexibility
(ramping & cycling is
costly*)
differences in demand
and/or supply conditions
— shifts of the demand
curve (day-night patter,
temperature)
— shifts of the supply
curve (weather, plant
availability)
— location of demand
— good sites for electricity
generation
— uncertainty in demand
(weather)
— uncertainty in supply
(weather, outages)
* “Costly” both in the sense of losses (operational costs) and the opportunity costs of constraints.
Figure 2: The Marginal Value Space v
Source: adopted from Hirth (2015a).
homogenous good. As physical constraints limit arbitrage, the marginal value varies along all three
axes. This is, according to our definition, heterogeneity.
More formally, Figure 2 can be thought of as a -Matrix where each element is[TxNxS]
an instantaneous marginal value at time step , at node , and at lead-time . Wev t∈T n∈N s∈St,n,s
call the -Matrix v of the elements the “marginal value space”. Electricity is hetero-[TxNxS] vt,n,s
geneous because not all elements of v are the same.
We are not the first, of course, to note that production-profile, location, and flexibility of
power plants matter for economics. Dedicated power system models, such as stochastic security-
constrained unit commitment models, implicitly take these factors into account. It is simple tools
such as LCOE and grid parity, however, that shape much of the public debate.
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5. Mean [range] prices for electricity were 44 €/MWh [–222; + 210]; for natural gas 26 €/MWh [21; 38]; for crude
oil 114 €/bbl [89; 130]. German spot prices from EPEX Spot, natural gas prices from German gas hub TTF, crude oil prices
for Brent. Texas spot prices from ERCOT, German imbalance prices from TSO TenneT,
6. The German spot market EPEX clears for each quarter-hour of the year as a uniform price; the ERCOT real-time
market of Texas clears every five minutes for each of all 10,000 bus bars of the system
Our formulation of three-dimensional heterogeneity provides an economic interpretation
in terms of prices. To us, it seems to be a useful and general way of thinking about a wide range
of economic issues in power generation, ranging from economic evaluation of power plant flexibility
and forecast errors to congestion pricing and the costs of wind and solar intermittency. These topics
are usually discussed separately; however, they can also be thought of as aspects of the three
dimensional heterogeneity of electricity.
2.4 Observing Heterogeneity in the Power Sector
Three-dimensional heterogeneity is reflected in reality: through price variation, market
design, and technology development. Take German price data from 2012 as an example. The range
of electricity prices was 1000% of the mean electricity price, and prices varied by a factor of two
during a normal day. The price of other energy carriers fluctuated much less: natural gas prices
varied 70% of the mean price, and crude oil prices by 36% of their mean; neither commodity
demonstrated within-day price variation.5 This is in line with expectations, as storage costs for
natural gas are higher than for oil, but much lower than for electricity. Price variation along the
other dimensions can also be substantial. The spread between day-ahead and real-time price in
Germany varied between -1600 €/MWh and 1400 €/MWh (Hirth & Ziegenhagen 2015); while the
electricity price is uniform across Germany, in Texas price differences of several hundred $/MWh
between different locations were not uncommon (Schumacher 2013). The peak load pricing liter-
ature (Boiteux 1949, Crew et al. 1995) offers the theoretical foundations for equilibrium pricing of
time-heterogeneous goods.
More structurally, heterogeneity is reflected in the design of whole power markets and
market-clearing mechanisms. European power exchanges typically clear the market each hour in
each bidding zone; U.S. markets often clear the market in steps of five minutes in each node of the
transmission grid. Such high-frequency market clearing would be of no use without temporal het-
erogeneity. Many spot markets feature a sequence of markets along lead-times, ranging from day-
ahead to intra-day to real-time (or balancing) markets, sometimes called a “multi-settlementdesign”.
Hence, there is not one electricity price per market and year, but 100,000 prices (in Germany) or
three billion prices (in Texas).6 Figure 2 can readily be thought of as an array of market-clearing
spot prices with, in the case of Texas, three billion elements. Not all dimensions of heterogeneity
are, however, reflected in all markets: German prices are uniform across space; grid constraints are
managed via command and control instruments.
Heterogeneity of electricity has not only shaped market design, but also technology de-
velopment. For homogenous goods, one single production technology is typically efficient. In elec-
tricity generation, there is a set of generation technologies that are efficient (Bessiere 1970, Stough-
ton et al. 1980, Grubb 1991, Stoft 2002). “Base load” plants have high investment, but low variable
costs; this is reversed for “peak load” plants (Table 2). The latter are specialized in only delivering
electricity at high prices, which rarely occurs. If electricity was a homogeneous good, no such
technology differentiation would have emerged.
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Table 2: Electricity Generation Technologies Have Adapted to Temporal Heterogeneity
Technology Annualized fixed costs(€/kWa) Variable costs (€/MWh)
Least-cost technology for
capacity factors of:
Nuclear 400 10 95%
Lignite 240 30 75%–95%
Hard coal 170 40 50%–75%
CCGT (natural gas) 100 55 5%–50%
OCGT (natural gas, oil) 60 140 5%
Cost data for central Europe with 2012 market prices for fuel, assuming a CO2 price of 20 €/t. About 85–90% of fixed costs
are capital costs. CCGTs are combined-cycle gas turbines, and OCGTs are open-cycle gas turbines. Source for technology
cost parameters: Hirth (2015a), based on the primary sources IEA & NEA (2010), VGB Powertech (2011), Black & Veatch
(2012), and Schro¨der et al. (2013).
7. Throughout the paper, we restrict the analysis to first-order conditions, assuming well-behaved functions.
3. WELFARE ECONOMICS OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION: TECHNOLOGY
PERSPECTIVE
This section derives the optimal generation mix. We formally derive the first-order con-
ditions which explicitly account for three-dimensional heterogeneity. These conditions can be in-
terpreted such that each technology produces a different economic good. This section generalizes
Joskow (2011) and formalizes Hirth et al. (2015).
3.1 Optimality Conditions: Marginal Benefit Equals Marginal Cost (for each technology)
The welfare-optimal quantity of any good is given by the intersection of the marginal∗q
economic value (benefit) of consuming the good and marginal economic cost of producing∗v(q )
it :7c(q)
∗ ∗v(q ) = c(q ) (3)
Throughout the paper, we will specify value and cost in energy terms ($/MWh). The long-term
marginal cost of producing one MWh of electricity with technology i, , is the average discountedci
private life-cycle cost per unit of output (e.g., IEA & NEA 2010, Moomaw et al. 2011):
Y
– yc (1 + r)∑ i,yy = 1
c := ∀i∈I (4)i Y
– yg (1 + r)∑ i,yy = 1
where is the fixed and variable cost (including capital cost) that occurs in year y, is thec gi,y i,y
amount of electricity generated in that year, r is the real discount rate, and Y is the life-time of the
asset in years. is termed “levelized energy costs” (LEC) or “levelized costs of electricity”ci
(LCOE). LCOE is a standard concept and broadly used.
The marginal value of a power generating technology is the value of its aggregated output:
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8. The existence of does not require perfect and complete markets, nor equilibrium conditions. We add interpretationvt,n,s
in terms of prices (which requires these assumptions) in brackets for convenience.
9. Assuming the optimal quantity of all technologies is positive. Otherwise the corresponding KKT-inequalities apply.
10. For example because they feature different variable costs, and hence are dispatched differently—or, because they
are located at different sites, maybe because at some locations wind speeds are high while at others local coal resources are
abundant.
T N S
v¯ = g ⋅ v ∀i∈I (5)∑ ∑ ∑i i,t,n,s t,n,s
t = 1 n = 1 s = 1
where is the instantaneous marginal value of electricity as defined in (1). This is the consumers’vt,n,s
willingness to pay for consuming one additional unit of electricity (MWh) at time t, node n, and
lead-time s. We define T to be one year, N one power system, and S the complete set of spot
markets.
Note that does not carry a subscript for generation technology—this is a formalvt,n,s
express of homogeneity (section 2a.
The weights is the share of output of technology i at the respective time step, node,gi,t,n,s
and lead-time, such that
T N S
g = 1 ∀i∈I (6)∑ ∑ ∑ i,t,n,s
t = 1 n = 1 s = 1
We label the -Matrix of the elements the “generation pattern” of technology i.[TxNxS] g gi i,t,n,s
Hence, the marginal value of a coal-fired plant, , is the average of the instantaneous value ofv¯coal
electricity, weighted with the production pattern of coal plants. [Under perfect and complete mar-
kets, equals the locational spot price, and equals the market value of a technology.]8v v¯t,n,s i
The I first order conditions for the optimal generation mix are:9
c = v¯ ∀i∈I (7)i i
3.2 Interpretation: Different Generators Produce Different Goods
These equations look innocent, but provide a number of relevant interpretations.
In general, the generation patterns of two technologies do not coincide .10 Hence,(g ≠ g )i j
their marginal value ($/MWh) does not coincide . The two technologies produce the same(v¯ ≠ v¯)i j
physical output (MWh of electricity), but they produce different economic goods. The value dif-
ference shows that these “electricity goods” are only imperfectly substitutable. While at a single
point (“instantaneously”), electricity from wind and coal is perfectly substitutable, over one year
(more precisely, over the full value space), it is not. The law of one price does not apply (Figure
3). Optimality condition (4) actually represents I optimality conditions for I different electricity
goods, corresponding to I generation technologies. Expressing optimality in this way might hence
be called a “technology perspective”.
4. WELFARE ECONOMICS OF ELECTRICITY GENERATION REFORMULATED:
LOAD PERSPECTIVE
The previous section derived first-order conditions for the optimal generation mix as the
equality of marginal costs and marginal benefits of each electricity good. This section derives an
10 / The Energy Journal
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Figure 3: LCOE and Marginal Value in the Long-Term Optimum
In the long-term optimum, the marginal value of each technology coincides with the marginal cost of that technology—
but, in general, it does not coincide with the marginal value of any other technology (levels are illustrative). “Load” will
be discussed below.
alternative formulation of the same optimality conditions in terms of the same electricity good, i.e.
a “reference good”. One can think of “transforming” the output of each generator into the same
good (the “transformation” is analytical, not physical). This perspective is mathematically equiva-
lent, but offers a number of interpretations that will turn out helpful for deriving an alternative cost
metric to LCOE.
4.1 Choosing “Load” as a Reference Electricity Good
As a reference electricity good, we choose “load” , defined as a MWh of electricity that(l)
has the pattern of electricity consumption. The matrix l, defined analogously to the “generation
pattern” (6), consists of elements that represent the share of consumption at the respectiveg li t,n,s
time-step, node, and lead time. The elements sum up to unity. The simplest way to supply this
electricity good can be imagined as a (hypothetical) “ideal” generator that follows load over time,
has the same spatial distribution as load, and forecast errors perfectly correlated to load.
Accordingly, we define the marginal value of load as the demand-weighted averagev¯load
of all :vt,n,s
T N S
v¯ = l ⋅ v (8)∑ ∑ ∑load t,n,s t,n,s
t = 1 n = 1 s = 1
is the consumers’ willingness to pay for an additional MWh of yearly electricity consumption,v¯load
assuming that it has the same pattern as infra-marginal consumption. [Under perfect and complete
markets, equals the average wholesale electricity prices consumers pay, .]v¯ p¯load load
4.2 Optimality Conditions from a Load-perspective
Now we reformulate the optimality conditions (7). Optimally, the marginal benefit of the
good load coincides with the marginal cost of producing this good by technology i:v¯load
Why Wind Is Not Coal / 11
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Figure 4: Optimal Quantity of Technology i in Terms of the Good i (Technology∗qi
Perspective) and Load (Load Perspective)
∗ ∗v¯ (q , ⋅ ) = σ(q , ⋅ ) ∀i∈I (9)load i i i
We term “System LCOE” and define it to be the sum of generation costs and the costs ofσ ci i
“transforming” the electricity good, :Di
σ(q , ⋅ ) :=c(q ) + D(q , ⋅ ) ∀i∈I (10)i i i i i i
Ueckerdt et al. (2013a) show that is the increase in system costs as generation from technologyDi
i is increased. Below we show that it can also be interpreted as a “value gap”. While is strictlyci
positive, can be of either sign.Di
Note that , is a function of only, but and are functions of other arguments asc q σ Di i i i
well, including power system parameters and the plant mix, just as . This reflects the fact that inv¯i
a (power) system, cost-benefit analysis cannot be done for individual parts of the system such as
one technology in isolation.
This set of I first-order conditions can be expressed as equalities of System LCOE:
∗ ∗σ(q , ⋅ ) = σ(q , ⋅ ) ∀i,j∈I (11)i i j j
The first-order condition for the optimal quantity can be written in two ways. First, in terms of∗qi
the electricity good that corresponds to the technology i (equation 7), and second, in terms of a
reference electricity good (equation 9). Figure 4 illustrates this duality graphically. The “technology
perspective” is depicted in bold lines. The intersection of marginal costs (LCOE) and marginal
value of i indicates the optimal quantity . The “load perspective” is drawn in dotted lines. The∗qi
intersection of marginal costs (System LCOE) and marginal value of load results in the same
quantity . Ignoring variability leads to the sub-optimal quantity , with corresponding dead-∗ 0q qi i
weight loss.
12 / The Energy Journal
Copyright  2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
4.3 Four Interpretations of Di
can be interpreted in at least four different ways. First, it can be understood as the costsDi
of transforming output from a technology to serve load. These costs not only depend on the gen-
eration pattern of the technology but also on properties of the rest of the power system. Hence, the
additional costs might be called system-level costs (or system costs), which has inspired us to coin
the term “System LCOE”.
Second, we can reformulate (10), using (9) and (7), to derive
∗ ∗ ∗D(q , ⋅ ) = v¯ (q , ⋅ )– v¯(q , ⋅ ) ∀i∈I (12)i i load i i i
is the value gap between the value of electricity that consumers demand and the value ofD v¯i load
electricity that a certain generator supplies, . Comparing of two technologies means simul-v¯ σi i
taneously comparing both cost and value differences.
Third, one might call variability cost. The value difference between technologies isDi
determined by the deviations of the generation pattern of a technology from the load pattern. We
interpret this mismatch as variability of that technology and as opportunity cost of variability.Di
It follows that all generators, not just VRE, are subject to variability and associated costs. More
fundamentally, it is the combination of electricity being heterogeneous (not all elements of v are
the same) and power plant variability that causes a value gap to emerge . If(g ≠ l) (v¯ ≠ v¯ )i i load
electricity was either homogeneous or generation was not variable it would hold that v¯ =i
.v¯ ∀i∈Iload
Fourth, can be interpreted as integration costs. There is a large branch of literature thatDi
assesses the impact of wind and solar variability in terms of “integration costs” when integrating
VRE generators into power systems (e.g. Dragon & Milligan 2003, Sims et al. 2011, Holttinen et
al. 2011, Milligan et al. 2011, NEA 2012, Baker et al. 2013, IEA 2014). These studies often calculate
different items, such as balancing, grid, and adequacy costs. It is unclear how the sum of these
items can be interpreted economically. Milligan et al. (2013) report that readers “add the integration
cost to the cost of energy from wind power to provide a comparison of wind energy to a more
dispatchable technology”. Presumably readers do this to assess competitiveness and efficiency;
therefore we believe it is sensible to define integration costs as , which allows such an assessmentDi
(Ueckerdt et al. 2013a, Hirth et al. 2015). According to this definition, integration costs are not
specific to VRE.
The two perspectives of sections 3 and 4—technology and load—correspond to two equiv-
alent ways of accounting for the economic consequences of wind and solar power intermittency.
In one perspective, intermittency leads to a reduction of the value of a technology compared tov¯i
the average wholesale electricity price . In the other perspective, system costs are added tov¯load
generation costs of the technology. Some analysts find one perspective more intuitive and appealing,
while others prefer the other. Energy traders and economists often prefer to think of variability
decreasing the value of wind and solar power. They often find the “technology perspective” to be
quite natural. System operators, policy makers, modelers, and power system engineers often strive
to understand the cost of variability and hence prefer the “load perspective”.
In the remainder of this paper we call system costs.Di
4.4 Why LCOE-comparisons, Grid Parity, and IAMs Can Be Problematic
The fact that each generation technology produces output of different value has important
implications for the interpretation of metrics and tools that are commonly used to assess power
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Figure 5: LCOE, Variability Costs, and System LCOE in the Long-term Economic
Equilibrium (levels are illustrative)
11. Comparing LCOE is meaningful if generators produce comparable output. If, say, nuclear power and lignite plants
have similarly low variable costs and are consequently dispatched similarly, are both located similarly far from load centers,
and are similarly inflexible, comparing costs is sufficient to determine relative competitiveness.
12. Furthermore, “grid parity” conceals the fact that grid fees, levies, taxes comprise a large share of retail prices. Hence
it takes a private perspective that has little implication for social efficiency (Hirth 2015b).
generating technologies: comparisons of LCOE, grid parity, and macroeconomic multi-sector mod-
els. All three approaches have in common that, if not carefully used, they ignore value differences
and can deliver biased results.
It is common practice in policy and industry documents (and also in academic articles) to
compare the LCOE of different technologies (Karlynn & Schwabe 2009, Fischedick et al. 2011,
IEA & NEA 2010, BSW 2011, EPIA 2011, Nitsch et al. 2010, IRENA 2012, GEA 2012, EIA
2013, DECC 2013, IRENA 2015). Authors and readers apparently appreciate the straightforward
interpretation that LCOE seems to allow. Many readers interpret cost advantage as a sign of effi-
ciency or competitiveness. Such reasoning would be correct if and only if, the value of output of
all generators was identical—which is not the case. In fact, comparing LCOE from different tech-
nologies is comparing the marginal costs of producing different goods.11
If power generating technologies are to be compared economically along a single axis,
System LCOE could be used. The optimality conditions (12) imply that System LCOE from dif-
ferent technologies can be compared to infer about efficiency of each technology. Figure 5 illustrates
the long-term optimum: while LCOE of different technologies do not coincide, System LCOE do.
Some studies seem to suggest that once a technology has reached “grid parity”, its de-
ployment is economically efficient (BSW 2011, EPIA 2011, Koch 2013, Fraunhofer ISE 2013,
Breyer & Gerlach 2013). Grid parity is usually defined as the point where LCOE of solar (or wind)
power fall below the retail electricity price. Again, this indicator ignores heterogeneity, and im-
plicitly compares the marginal value of one good ( ) with the marginal cost of a different goodv¯load
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.
12 Comparing a technology’s LCOE to the wholesale electricity price (Kost et al. 2012,(c )solar
Clover 2013, Ru¨diger & Matieu 2014) is based on the same flawed implicit assumption.
Ignoring value differences among generation technologies introduces a bias: it makes low-
value technologies look better than they actually are, biasing their optimal/equilibrium market share
upwards. This systematically favors conventional base-load generators relative to peak-load gen-
erators (“base load bias”), and, at high penetration rates, wind and solar power relative to dispatch-
able generators (“VRE bias”, for quantitative evidence see section 0). Simple macroeconomic mod-
els can be subject to this bias as well.
Economists have used calibrated multi-sector models for many years for research and
policy advice (Leontief 1941, Johansen 1960, Taylor & Black 1974). Today, “integrated assessment
models” (IAMs), sometimes based on computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, are an im-
portant tool for assessing climate policy and the role of renewables in mitigating greenhouse gas
emissions (Fischedick et al. 2011, Edenhofer et al. 2013, Luderer et al. 2014, Knopf et al. 2013,
IPCC 2014).
Large-scale models are applied to account for macroeconomic effects, endogenously model
fuel prices and energy demand, and incorporate endogenous technological learning. These capa-
bilities, however, come at the price of coarse resolution. The typical time resolution of IAMs is 5–
10 years and model regions are of continental scale. Due to numerical constraints, IAMs cannot
provide the temporal and spatial resolution required to explicitly represent the heterogeneity of
electricity. When optimizing the generation mix, old versions of such models implicitly equate the
marginal costs of different goods.
Accounting for heterogeneity and thus accounting for the impacts of variability is a major
challenge to IAM modeling (Luderer et al. 2014, Baker et al. 2013). While all generators are subject
to variability, we focus here on VRE, because there is a rich academic debate around them. Many
models use stylized formulations to account for variability, however, most of these approaches lack
welfare-theoretical rigor. While some models—mostly older versions—ignore variability altogether
and thus generate results that are biased towards optimistic cost estimates, today most IAMs apply
some sort of stylized formulation to represent the challenges of variability. Of the 17 models re-
viewed by Luderer et al. (2014), two ignore variability; the others limit the maximum share of
variable renewables (seven models), require dedicated storage or back-up capacity (eight models),
or add a cost penalty (four models: MERGE, MESSAGE, ReMIND, and WITCH). The most basic
approach is to set a hard limit to the generation share of wind and solar. However, this implicitly
assumes zero marginal value at higher shares and ignore the possibility for system adjustments even
under strong economic pressure. A more economic approach is to introduce an “integration cost
penalty” that might increase with its penetration. Other models require the provision of specific
technology options to foster the integration of VRE, like gas-fired backup capacities or electricity
storage. Six models represent load variability with a load duration curve. Sullivan et al. (2013)
propose a “flexibility constraint” to account for variability. However, all these approaches have
three limitations. First, the foundations and completeness of the approaches is unclear. Often mo-
tivated from a technical perspective, they lack a clear relation to the economic costs of variability.
Second, each approach focuses on specific aspects of variability while omitting others. Finally,
these stylized representations are difficult to parameterize.
System LCOE offers a pathway of how the electricity sector could be modeled in IAMs.
It contains variability costs, which serve as cost penalties that account for all aspects of variability
on a rigorous economic basis. Not only wind and solar power, but all generation technologies are
associated with such costs and should therefore be represented by their System LCOE. To estimate
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13. Multi-sector models that capture important issues such as learning curves or macroeconomic effects often need to
reduce power system detail to remain numerically feasible.
variability costs, tools other than IAMs are needed, such as high-resolution numerical power system
models. To keep this parameterization manageable, it should focus on the most important aspects
of variability. Implementing System LCOE can be combined with other more explicit approaches
of representing variability. Those aspects that can be directly represented could be exempt from the
System LCOE metric. For example, an explicit representation of residual load duration curves can
be complemented with parameterizations of grid and balancing costs (Ueckerdt et al. 2014). The
following section suggests approaches of how to estimate the necessary parameter values.
5. EMPIRICALLY ESTIMATING VARIABILITY COSTS: PRAGMATIC IDEAS
For long-term planning, policy and investment decisions, governments, utilities, and sys-
tem operators might want to estimate the optimal generation mix for the future. The first-order
conditions (7) and (9) assume complete information—specifically, full knowledge about the mar-
ginal value space v. In reality, information is often far from complete. This section suggests how
to estimate system costs empirically under incomplete information. It proposes splitting system
costs into three “cost components” and shows how they can be estimated from existing power sector
models and observed market data. We hope thereby to provide a pragmatic and feasible approach
to estimate system costs.
Cost components might be useful for three reasons: to reduce complexity and improve
understanding; to use piece-wise evidence; to use market data for estimation.
5.1 Decomposition—the Three Components of System Costs
Many published studies estimate the impact of one dimension of heterogeneity (e.g. “the
costs of wind forecast errors”). Such studies are often based on models that represent one dimension
of variability (much) better than others. “Super models” that represents all three dimensions in full
detail are rare: the best stochastic security-constrained unit commitment models might come close
to this ideal, but in practice many studies rely on much less sophisticated tools.13 Not only models
are incomplete, the same is true for markets. For example, transmission constraints are not priced
in most European markets. Given such incomplete knowledge about the marginal value space v,
we propose a pragmatic approximation: estimating the impact of each dimension of heterogeneity
separately as one “cost component” and adding them up.
• The impact of time is called “profile costs” (because the temporal generation profile deter-
mines its size).
• The impact of space is called “grid costs” (because grid constraints determine its size).
• The impact of lead-time is called “balancing costs” (because forecast errors need to be bal-
anced).
We use the sum of the three components as an estimator of the cost of variability:ˆDi
profile grid balancingˆD = D + D + D ∀i∈I (13)i i i i
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is only an approximation of the system costs . The three cost components interact with eachˆD Di i
other such that there is an (unknown) interaction term. Policy that reduces one cost component
might increase another.
When there is only information about the temporal structure of the marginal value of
electricity, reduces to . We define profile costs as the difference between the load-weightedv vt,n,s t
and the generation-weighted marginal value:
T
profileD := (l – g ) ⋅ v ∀i∈I (14)∑i t i,t t
t = 1
We define grid costs and balancing costs accordingly:
N
gridD := (l – g ) ⋅ v ∀i∈I (15)∑i n i,n n
n = 1
S
balancingD := (l – g ) ⋅ v ∀i∈I (16)∑i s i,s s
s = 1
Note that all cost components all defined in marginal terms, as is the marginal value of electricity;v
all components can be positive or negative; all components are different for different technologies.
Even if a “super model” is available that captures all three dimensions appropriately, these
three “cost components” might provide a helpful way of post-processing and interpreting model
results. The Appendix provides further discussion on the interaction term and an example calculation
of the cost components.
The waterfall diagrams of Figure 6 illustrate the three cost components for different tech-
nologies. Base load generators such as nuclear power (a) have a lower value than the marginal
value of consumption ( ), while mid-load generators such as coal-fired plants (b) have a valuev¯load
that is similar to . The inflexibility of these generators reduces their value. Peak-load generatorsv¯load
such as gas-fired plants (c) have a higher value, because they produce disproportionally during
times of high prices, are located closer to load centers, and can provide short-term flexibility—
hence all cost components increase their marginal value. The value of VRE is strongly affected by
their penetration. At low penetration, their value is typically higher than the marginal value of
consumption, especially in the case of solar power (d): the benefits of producing during times of
high prices outweigh the costs of forecast errors. At high penetration, profile, balancing, and grid
related costs tend to reduce the value of solar as well as of wind power (e).
The three cost components, profile, balancing, and grid costs, are not constant parameters,
but functions of many system properties. They typically increase with penetration, as illustrated in
Figure 7.
5.2 Market- and Model-based Estimation
Each cost component can be estimated from modeled shadow prices or from observed
market prices. Table 3 lists the markets and models that can provide information regarding each
cost component. Take the example of grid costs: they can be estimated from locational shadow
prices derived from grid models, or from empirically observed nodal prices. Where such prices do
not exist, zonal prices and locational differentiated grid fees can serve as proxies.
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Figure 6: The Marginal Value of Nuclear Power (a), Coal-fired Plants (b), Gas-fired Plants
(c), Solar Power at Low Penetration (d), and Wind Power at High Penetration (e)
Levels are illustrative.
18 / The Energy Journal
Copyright  2016 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
Figure 7: Profile, Balancing, and Grid Costs Typically Increase with Penetration
For wind and solar power, profile costs are often negative at low penetration.
Table 3: Estimating Cost Components from Markets and Models
Models Markets
Profile costs power market models day-ahead spot markets
Balancing costs stochastic unit commitment models real-time spot markets; balancingpower / imbalance markets
Grid costs (optimal) power flow models / grid
models
locational (nodal, zonal) spot
markets; locational grid fees
Both markets and models have limitations: markets are never complete and free of market
failures. Power markets can be off the equilibrium for extended periods of time, given the long
life-time of assets. In some markets (e.g. many balancing markets), regulators have implemented
average, not marginal, pricing. In other markets (e.g. many grids), costs are socialized altogether.
Models, in turn, are necessarily simplifications of reality: externalities are often incom-
pletely captured, and some models do not estimate the long-term equilibrium. In addition, numerical
models are often calibrated to historical market prices, and might hence be subject to the same
limitations as markets. While both sources of empirical data are imperfect, diversified estimation
methodology helps derive robust estimates.
6. WHAT IS SPECIAL ABOUT WIND AND SOLAR POWER?
When we began writing this paper, we were looking for the fundamental economic dif-
ferences between VRE and other generators—“the economics of intermittency”—in order to pa-
rameterize “integration costs” in multi-sector models. The previous literature had identified three
specific properties of VRE: fluctuations, forecast errors, and the fact that good sites are often far
from load centers (GE Energy 2010, Milligan et al. 2011, Borenstein 2012, IEA 2014).
However, as shown above, these properties are not limited to wind and solar power. It is
true that the generation patterns in time, space, and lead-time affect the economic value of electricity
generated from wind and solar power—but that is true for all generation technologies! It is true
that using LCOE comparisons, grid parity, or simple multi-sector models to compare VRE with
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Table 4: Quantitative Literature on Integration Costs of Wind Power
Models Markets
Profile costs Grubb (1991), Rahman & Bouzguenda (1994),
Rahman (1990), Bouzguenda & Rahman (1993),
Hirst & Hild (2004), ISET et al. (2008), Braun et
al. (2008), Obersteiner & Saguan (2010),
Obersteiner et al. (2009), Boccard (2010), Green &
Vasilakos (2011), Energy Brainpool (2011),
Valenzuela & Wang (2011), Martin & Diesendorf
(1983), Swider & Weber (2006), Lamont (2008),
Bushnell (2010), Gowrisankaran et al. (2011),
Mills & Wiser (2012, 2014), Mills (2011), Nicolosi
(2012), Kopp et al. (2012), Hirth (2013, 2015b),
Bolkesjø et al. (2014), Hirth & Mu¨ller (2015)
Borenstein (2008), Sensfuß (2007), Sensfuß &
Ragwitz (2011), Fripp & Wiser (2008), Brown
& Rowlands (2009), Lewis (2010), Green &
Vasilakos (2012), Hirth (2013)
Balancing costs Grubb (1991), Gross et al. (2006), Strbac et al.
(2007), Smith et al. (2007), DeMeo et al. (2007),
Mills & Wiser (2012, 2013, 2014), Gowrisankaran
et al. (2011), Carlsson (2011), Holttinen et al.
(2011), Garrigle & Leahy (2013), Pudjianto et al.
(2013)
Holttinen (2005), Pinson et al. (2007),
Obersteiner et al. (2010), Holttinen &
Koreneff (2012), Katzenstein & Apt (2012),
Louma et al. (2014), e3 consult (2014), Hirth
et al. (2015)
Grid costs Strbac et al. (2007), Denny & O’Malley (2007),
dena (2010), Holttinen et al. (2011), NREL (2012),
Pudjianto et al. (2013), E-Bridge et al. (2014),
50Hertz et al. (2014)
Hamidi et al. (2011), Schumacher (2013),
Brown and Rowlands (2009), Lewis (2010),
Hirth et al. (2015)
dispatchable generators introduces a bias—but the comparison among dispatchable technologies is
also biased.
Based on economic reasoning, it seems hard to support the proposition that one group of
(“intermittent”) generators that is qualitatively distinct from another group of (“dispatchable”) gen-
erators. Rather, electricity itself that is different from other economic goods, and each electricity-
producing technology has particular properties. So—are wind and solar power just two more power
generation technologies?
What is special about wind and solar power is not the existence, but the size of system
costs. In predominantly thermal power systems, at high penetration rates (such as 20 + % for wind
or 10 + % for solar in annual energy terms), they are the technologies that produce least-value
electricity. In other words, ignoring value differences can bias the assessment of all generators, but
the upward bias might be greatest for wind and solar power. In the following, we present results
from a quantitative literature review of wind power system costs that produced this finding (updated
from Hirth et al. 2015).
Table 4 lists all studies we are aware of that can be used to extract wind variability cost
estimates. With a few exceptions (notably Grubb 1991, Holttinen et al. 2011, and Mills & Wiser
2012), most of these studies report estimates of one single cost component.
Figure 8 and Figure 9 summarize estimates of profile costs and balancing costs that we
extracted from these studies. Profile costs are estimated to be 20 €/MWh at 30–40% penetration;
many studies find negative costs at low penetration (implying a higher price received at spot markets
than the load-weighted price). Balancing costs are estimated to rise from 2 €/MWh at low pen-
etration to 4 €/MWh at high penetration. Grid costs (not in figure) are likely to be below 15
€/MWh under most conditions (Hirth & Mu¨ller 2015).
The most important finding of the literature review is that system costs can become very
high at high penetration rates. When wind penetration reaches 30–40%, they seem to be in the
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Figure 8: Wind Profile Cost Estimates for Thermal Power Systems
Estimates extracted from about 30 published studies. Studies are differentiated by how they determine electricity prices:
from markets (squares), from short-term dispatch modeling (diamonds, dotted line), or from long-term dispatch and in-
vestment modeling (triangles, bold line). To improve comparability, the system base price has been normalized to 70 €/
MWh in all the studies. Updated from Hirth et al. (2015).
Figure 9: Wind Balancing Cost Estimates for Thermal Power Systems
Estimates extracted from about 20 published studies based on market prices (squares) or models (diamonds, dotted line).
Three market-based studies report very high balancing costs, but these are unlikely to reflect marginal costs. All other
estimates are below 6 €/MWh. Studies of hydro-dominated systems show very low balancing costs (triangles). Updated
from Hirth et al. (2015).
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range of 25–35 €/MWh, assuming an average electricity price of 70 €/MWh. In other words,
electricity from wind power is worth only 35–45 €/MWh under those conditions, 35–50% less than
the average electricity price. If wind LCOE are 60 €/MWh, system (variability) costs are 50%
of generation costs.
However, the literature also shows that system costs are low, or even negative, at low
penetration rates. Up to 10% penetration rate, system costs are most likely to be small relative to
generation costs.
Four additional findings can be identified: (i) costs increase with penetration; (ii) at high
penetration, profile costs are higher than balancing costs; (iii) long-term models (with endogenous
investment) report lower profile costs than short-term models; (iv) costs are lower in hydro-domi-
nated systems than in thermal systems.
Positive system costs imply that optimal deployment is lower than it would be otherwise—
but it is not necessarily low in absolute terms. Even IAMs that attach significant integration costs
to wind power often find high renewable shares under strict climate policy. The same is true for
power market models: Neuhoff et al. (2008) reports an optimal wind share for the UK of 40%.
Hirth (2015a) finds an optimal wind share of 20% [1–45%], roughly in line with Lamont (2008).
Mu¨sgens (2013) and Eurelectric (2013) reports an optimal wind share in Europe of more than one
third by 2050.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has taken a micro-economic perspective on electricity generation. We have
shown that electricity is a heterogeneous economic good and that, consequently, cost comparisons
and multi-sector models have to be used with care. We hope this serves modelers as well as those
who advise decision makers based on such tools.
We have argued that electricity is a paradoxical economic good: it can be understood as
being perfectly homogenous, and as very heterogeneous. Electricity prices vary over time, across
space, and with respect to lead-time between contract and delivery. As a consequence, the economic
value of electricity generated from different power plant technologies diverges. Physically, they all
produce megawatt-hours of electricity; economically, they produce different goods. Common tools
to evaluate generation technologies—LCOE, grid parity, (simple) multi-sector models—account for
cost differences among generation technologies, but ignore these value differences. They implicitly
equate marginal costs and benefits of different goods. Ignoring value differences introduces two
biases: the “base-load bias” and the “VRE bias”. VRE generators, such as wind and solar power,
produce particularly low-value electricity if deployed at large scale, hence the upward bias is par-
ticular strong. System planning based on biased analyses will lead to a sub-optimal plant mix and
corresponding welfare losses.
This leads us to three methodological conclusions. First, when comparing the economics
of power generation technologies in a one-dimensional figure, System LCOE should be used instead
of LCOE. System LCOE accounts for both value and cost differences; the metric can be interpreted
as the cost of each generation technology to produce the same good. Second, multi-sector models,
such as integrated assessment models or general equilibrium models, need to carefully account for
value differences among generation technologies. This is especially relevant if they are used to
model structural shifts in electricity supply such as deep decarbonization of the power sector. Finally,
grid parity is not a useful indicator for the economic efficiency of generation technologies. We
recommend that it is not used.
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The most important policy conclusion of this assessment might be that there is none. In
principle, markets are well equipped to price heterogeneity. Neither electricity heterogeneity nor
wind and solar variability constitutes an externality, and there is no need for policy interventions.
Looking closer to real-word markets, the situation is less black and white. More than in other
sectors, governments and regulators shape the design of electricity markets. In in many markets,
electricity prices variation are suppressed by the way markets are designed. For example, in many
European markets, regulators mandate geographically uniform prices. Often, balancing prices do
not reflect marginal, but average, costs. The findings of this article imply that policy should allow
electricity prices to vary along all three dimensions of heterogeneity. They should do so at the level
of wholesale markets, retail markets, and policy instruments—subject to the transaction cost trade-
off. Specifically, renewable support schemes should be permeable for price signals in the sense that
they should transmit price variations to investors. Simple feed-in-tariffs eliminate all price vari-
ability.
Finally, this paper might also offer a fundamental interpretation of the nature of power
generating technologies. It shows that wind and solar are not that different from other generators
in the end. It is indeed questionable if it is sensible to draw a line between “variable” and “dis-
patchable” generators. Each generation technology has specific characteristics and produces output
of a different value in $/MWh terms. Accounting for these value differences is important when
assessing wind and solar power—but it is equally important when assessing other technologies.
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APPENDIX
Interaction Term
is only an approximation of the system costs . The three cost components interactˆD Di i
with each other and there is an (unknown) interaction term .φˆi
ˆ ˆD = D + φ ∀i∈I (17)i i i
However, lacking knowledge of the sign of the interaction, we believe setting to zero is a sensibleφˆi
first-order approximation.
Example Calculation
As an illustrative example, assume one needs to assess the marginal value of wind power
in Germany at some point in the future. Say, there is a power market model available that delivers
estimates for the marginal value of load of 70 €/MWh and of wind power of 60 €/MWh, but that
model does not capture the grid, nor does it capture uncertainty—hence does not account for the
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14. Grid costs are the spread between the load-weighted and the wind-weighted electricity price:
12 6
– = 2
3 3
second and the third dimension of heterogeneity. From a literature review, one estimates balancing
costs (the cost of wind forecast errors) to be 3 €/MWh. Finally, a grid study reports the marginal
value of electricity in Northern Germany to be 6 €/MWh higher in the South than in the North,
and it is known that two thirds of all turbines are located in the North while two thirds of con-
sumption is in the South. Hence, profile costs are 10 €/MWh, balancing costs 3 €/MWh, and grid
costs 2 €/MWh.14 In sum, the marginal value of wind power is v¯ˆwind = 55 €/MWh, and the variability
cost of wind power = 15 €/MWh.ˆDwind
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